This paper examines lobbying and corruption as alternative ways of dealing with regulatory obstacles. I propose a model where firms facing a costly regulation can bribe a rule-enforcing bureaucrat to get around it, lobby the government to reduce its impact, or do both. I then use a firm-level dataset of Eastern European enterprises to examine whether firms use membership in a lobby group as a substitute for the bribe payments they make to rule-enforcing bureaucrats. The results indicate that firms who join lobby groups do not stop paying bribes to bureaucrats, and firms more impacted by corruption are no more likely to join a lobby group than their counterparts. On the other hand joining a lobby group increases the likelihood of a firm bribing legislators and other rule makers, suggesting that lobbying introduces the possibility of state capture by allowing firms access to policy makers that they wouldn't otherwise have. * Eugene Kiselev is currently a PhD student at Brandeis University International Business School.
Introduction
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, firms in many post-Soviet countries have been in an ongoing battle against corruption and government interference while operating in an environment of excessive regulation and legal uncertainty. Still the business environment in these countries continues to mature, and a potentially promising development has been the emergence of business associations. These groups provide a number of services to firms, including dispute resolution mechanisms, domestic and international product market information, help with licensing, and perhaps most importantly the lobbying of local and federal governments to achieve outcomes favorable to association members.
Recent literature has explored whether lobbying efforts by business associations can eventually replace bribe payments to bureaucrats. Researchers argue that at the countrylevel, lobbying should eventually overtake corruption as a mechanism for achieving outcomes in the private sector as economies grow and political and legal institutions develop.
A similar argument has been put forward at the firm level, suggesting that as enterprises grow they will forego bribing rule-enforcers (bureaucrats) in favor of lobbying rulemakers; the logic being that the need to bribe bureaucrats to get around complex and unfavorable regulations will disappear once lobbying efforts succeed in making these regulations more firm-friendly. While this outcome appears plausible, as yet there have been no empirical studies attempting to establish a strong causal link between bureaucratic corruption and lobbying by business associations. In addition, while recent studies have examined the relative impact of lobbying and bureaucratic corruption on firm outcomes such as sales growth and political influence, researchers have yet to investigate political corruption and whether business associations play a role in state capture through private payments directed at policy makers. This paper investigates the relationship between lobbying and corruption by first proposing a simple model of a firm dealing with costly government regulations. The model examines the conditions under which the firm will choose to bribe or lobby to deal with the regulations, and offers testable predictions. The empirical analysis begins by examining whether the determinants of bribe payments and lobby group membership in the former Soviet Union are in fact the ones suggested by the model, and then asks whether bribe payments to bureaucrats have any direct bearing on the decision to join a lobby group. As lobbying is not the sole function of a business association, the analysis also looks at the other services that associations provide in order to determine whether different firms derive different benefits from membership. Finally I ask whether joining a lobby group leads to political corruption by investigating whether firms use business associations to gain access to and bribe rulemakers and other high-level officials. Turning the focus to political corruption I find that joining a business association increases the likelihood of a firm making bribe payments to legislators to bring about regulatory change. In other words, not only do association members continue paying bribes to rule-enforcing bureaucrats but they are also more inclined to influence legislation through bribe payments to rulemakers. However not all business association members are equally likely to engage in political corruption. Firms that value the lobbying and dispute resolution services provided by associations are in fact more likely to bribe legislators, but other firms more concerned with accrediting standards or domestic and international product market information are not. I conclude that business associations serve a multitude of functions, many of which are unrelated to political corruption.
However they can also act as a gateway to accessing and bribing rulemakers for firms that lobby the government or are involved in regulatory disputes.
The analysis concludes that both regulatory conditions and firm-level characteristics influence decisions regarding bribery and lobby group membership. Though firms do not join business associations simply to avoid paying bribes, the conditions underpinning both decisions are certainly interrelated. Furthermore some firms take advantage of the access to public officials granted by business associations and bribe legislators to affect favorable outcomes. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background on business associations and lobby groups in Europe and elsewhere and discusses relevant theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 proposes a simple model of lobbying and corruption. Section 4 presents the data, while section 5 discusses the empirical strategy and presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
Business Associations and Lobby Groups: Theory and Evidence
Many post-Soviet countries share a number of economic and regulatory problems that require collective action on the part of private actors to facilitate change. These include complicated and frequently changing legal codes, regulatory obstacles that increase the costs of starting and operating businesses, few reliable dispute resolution mechanisms, and of course bureaucratic corruption. The emergence of business associations in the late 1990's and early 2000's can be attributed to the desire of businesses to improve many of these conditions. Country-specific case studies have shown that associations targeting specific obstacles can have significant success in promoting efficiency and precipitating regulatory change, including expediting business licensing and registration, providing firms with legal services to combat predatory government practices, and even providing governments with the necessary impetus to undertake large-scale endeavours such as macroeconomic reform (Sullivan, 2007; Duvanova, 2006; Doner & Schneider, 2000) . Empirical analyses utilizing surveys of business associations and association members have provided additional support for the positive influence of these organizations. Analyses of Russian associations show that membership offers benefits such as dispute resolution, consulting, and other services, and that relative to non-members, members are quicker to adopt new technologies, are more likely to import/export, and have higher levels of investment (Pyle, 2005; Pyle, 2006) .
The lobbying component of business associations cannot be overlooked, and the assessment of lobby groups as rent-seeking organizations is a constant theme in the literature. Much of the theoretical research assumes lobbying is simply a transfer of resources from one group to another, so that the distinction between lobbying and political corruption is nebulous at best.
1 Deliberate attempts to separate out the effects of lobbying and corruption in a theoretical setting are relatively uncommon, but studies that have done so draw the distinction on the basis of information provision to politicians vs. direct contributions (Bennedsen & Feldmann, 2001) or in the transfer cost differences of the two activities (Begovic, 2005) . A unique recharacterization of the distinction between lobbying and corruption is presented by Harstad and Svensson, who define lobbying as any activity (including a transfer of resources) that aims to change existing policy, whereas corruption (in the form of bribery) is a tool to get around rules and regulations (Harstad & Svensson, 2011) . They model this relationship in the context of firms paying bribes to avoid regulatory hurdles; bureaucrats cannot commit to not asking for higher bribes in the future, and as bribes are rising in firms' investment levels they find that continuing to bribe rule enforcers becomes relatively less desirable than joining a lobby group to change existing regulations. The result at the micro-level is that small firms bribe whereas large firms lobby.
A small empirical literature has sprung up alongside the Harstad and Svensson model.
Utilizing the 2000 World Business Environment Survey, Bennedsen and Feldmann find that large firms have more political influence relative to smaller ones. In addition they perceive corruption to be less of a problem and pay bribes to "get things done" less frequently. They also find benefits to political influence in the form of higher sales and more government subsidies (Bennedsen & Feldmann, 2009 ). Campos and Giovannoni make use of the 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, and while find-ing no direct correlation between bureaucratic corruption and lobby membership their analysis does conclude that large firms are associated with lobbying while small ones are more likely to bribe. In addition they find that lobbying increases both political influence and sales growth whereas corruption does not (Campos & Giovannoni, 2008) . However their study suffers from using association membership and lobbying interchangeably, as they do not examine other association functions. They also do not distinguish between bureaucratic and political corruption, and in doing so misrepresent their bribe payments variable in the survey. The most recent study to examine the lobbying and corruption relationship is by Sukiassyan and Nugent. They employ both the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS surveys, as well as the panel of firms surveyed in both years. Exploring primarily firm outcomes they find that association membership increases not only sales growth but also growth in exports and R&D. Most importantly they discover that lobbying has the smallest effect on firm outcomes, with other association benefits such as product market information and accreditation standards being more salient. Like previous studies they find that bribe payments do not affect firm performance (Sukiassyan & Nugent, 2011) .
In many of these empirical papers there are potential problems arising from association membership and bribe payments being endogenous to firm outcomes such as political influence and growth. While the latest studies acknowledge these concerns, they are nonetheless limited in their ability to convincingly show causality. This paper contends with endogeneity concerns by making use of the panel structure of the data, examining business association membership dynamics and their effect on relevant outcome variables. In addition I extend the literature in multiple directions, both by proposing a new theoretical framework to study the relationship between lobbying and bureaucratic corruption, and by examining the link between lobby group membership and political corruption. 
Strategies & Payoffs

Period 1
In the first period the firm faces a regulatory cost of R 1 = cS 1 . It can either bribe a bureaucrat to eliminate R 1 entirely, lobby the government to reduce the cost of regulations in the second period while still paying R 1 in the current period, or lobby the government and pay a bribe in the first period. 3 The first period payoffs are as follows:
where b 1 is the first period bribe payment to the bureaucrat
where L is the amount spent on lobbying efforts
If the firm chooses to bribe in the first period, it will negotiate the bribe amount with the bureaucrat. It will never pay more than the cost of the regulation, R 1 . Similarly the bureaucrat will not accept anything less than the expected risk of soliciting the bribe.
I assume the expected penalty to the bureaucrat is θαb, where θ is the probability of being caught and α > 1 is the severity of the penalty as a function of the bribe amount
The value of b is determined in a Nash bargaining 2 This can describe many types of regulations. Tax regulations are directly tied to a firm's profitability. Production licenses, environmental or labor regulations are a function of production and output and therefore tied to sales as well. Though the per-unit cost of regulation is the same for firms of different sizes, in this setup larger firms will pay more in total.
3 I assume that lobbying efforts take one period to succeed in reducing the burden of regulation.
framework assuming the bureaucrat has a relative bargaining power of β ∈ (0, 1). The bribe amount is then determined through the following optimization problem:
I assume θα < 1 so the bureaucrat will always find it in their interest to negotiate some bribe amount. Plugging R 1 = cS 1 into the above maximization problem and solving for the optimal bribe, we have that b 1 = βcS 1 . We can immediately see that lobbying and bribing in the first period strictly dominates lobbying and paying the full cost of the regulation. Whether lobbying and bribing dominates only bribing will depend on how lobbying in period 1 affects regulations in period 2, which is what I turn to now.
Period 2
The firm has sales of S 2 = (1 + g)S 1 , where g is the growth rate of the firm (and can be negative). It again faces a regulation, R 2 . If the firm lobbied in the first period, the cost of the regulation in period 2 is reduced based on the amount spent on lobbying. 4 The second period cost of regulation is defined as follows:
Where δ ∈ (0, 1] represents the extent to which the regulatory environment can be improved through lobbying. 5 This setup assumes that there are decreasing returns to lobbying, with each additional unit of L leading to a smaller reduction in R 2 .
In the second period the firm can either choose to pay R 2 or again bribe a bureaucrat to sidestep it. If it chooses to bribe, the bribe amount b 2 is again determined through Nash bargaining:
4 Lobbying effectiveness may also depend on other firms' actions. Introducing an additional parameter to represent other firms' contributions to lobbying efforts does not affect the main results of the model. As this feature of lobbying is not the primary focus of the model, it is not presented here. 5 For example, δ = 0.5 indicates that even an infinite amount spent on lobbying can only cut the regulatory cost in half. The intuition is that lobbying can improve the regulatory environment and be less costly to firms, but some regulations will always exist. 6 This form of the bargaining solution is also used in Harstad & Svensson (2011) .
Plugging in for R 2 and solving, we have:
To determine whether the firm chooses to pay the regulation or again bribe the bureaucrat we need to compare b 2 and R 2 . Some algebra reveals that bribing will alway be preferable to paying R 2 so long as L >
. This fraction is always negative given the domain of β and δ. Therefore a firm will choose to bribe in period 2 irrespective of its period 1 decision regarding L.
It is interesting to note that a lobby amount L > 0 will always reduce b 2 .
7 This is because lobbying reduces the period 2 regulatory burden on the firm, which then pushes down the bribe it is willing to pay to avoid what is left of the regulation. However lobbying can only impact the size of the bribe and not whether a firm chooses to pay a bribe. Even when L = 0 we have that b 2 = βcS 1 (1 + g), which is positive so long as g > −1 (the firm is still operating). Likewise, lim
indicating that even infinitely large lobbying efforts still lead to positive equilibrium b 2 so long as g > −1 and δ < 1. 
Optimal Lobbying and Model Equilibrium
Given that bribing is a best response in both periods, we are left with two sets of strategies: {bribe, bribe} (bribe in both periods) and {lobby+bribe, bribe} (both lobby and bribe in the first period and bribe in the second period). To compare these two strategies we must determine whether a firm can justify paying L in period 1 to reduce the bribe payment it makes in period 2. The two-period payoffs for these strategies are as follows:
7 This can be seen from taking the derivative of b 2 :
The first step is to solve for the equilibrium L if the firm chooses to lobby:
Clearly lobbying is only an option if L * > 0. If the model parameters are such that the optimal lobby amount is negative, a firm would simply not lobby and choose {bribe, bribe}. Therefore βcS 1 (1 + g)δ > 1 is a condition that must be met in order for a firm to choose {lobby+bribe, bribe}. Holding other parameters constant, we see that larger firms (in terms of sales or sales growth) are more likely to lobby than smaller ones, and the amount they choose to spend on lobbying is also a function of their size.
As there are decreasing returns to lobbying, there is an upper bound value of L at which lobbying is no longer justified. To complete the characterization of the equilibrium
Comparing L * and L cutof f it is obvious that the equilibrium lobby amount will never exceed the upper bound value. Therefore we can conclude that a firm will choose {lobby+bribe, bribe} so long as L * > 0, and {bribe, bribe} otherwise.
Discussion
The model equilibrium provides a number of testable predictions. It first indicates that lobbying is a function of the size of the firm. If a firm is too small in period 1, or if it does not grow enough by period 2, then the benefit of lobbying will not justify the cost. This is because of the assumption that the regulatory cost is a function of firm size, so the proportional reduction in R 2 as a result of lobbying will be significantly smaller if a firm's regulatory burden is low to begin with.
The second important result is that bribing a bureaucrat is always a best response.
Unlike Harstad & Svensson (2011) , this model suggests that as a firm grows it does not switch from bribing to lobbying but rather engages in both activities simultaneously.
This is a more intituitive outcome because lobbying can never completely eliminate all regulatory costs. Even in an effective and manageable regulatory environment, firms may still choose to bribe rule enforcers to bypass certain expensive regulatory requirements.
The size of the bribe payment is determined by the total regulatory cost. Larger firms are willing to pay more because the benefit of avoiding the regulation is greater.
However c, the per-unit cost of the regulation, can be thought of as the relative burden under different regulatory regimes. Bribe payments are also increasing in c, indicating that firms who find the regulatory environment to be a greater obstacle will be paying larger bribes.
Finally there is an interesting interplay between bribing and lobbying. To the extent that lobbying reduces a firm's regulatory burden it will also reduce the bribe payment that the firm is willing to make. Nevertheless, even when no lobbying occurs the firm will still bribe (again bribing is always a best response). Similarly bribing does not directly affect the decision to lobby. However no lobbying will occur when β is low because the Table 1 presents the countries included in the survey and the associated number of observations, while Table 2 describes the outcome and explanatory variables relevant to the analysis.
The survey data contain two key sets of variables concerning corruption and lobby group membership. Bureaucratic corruption data is encompassed in two variables:
pay_bribe and log_total_bribe. The former is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm reports having paid a bribe to "get things done" with regard to customs, licenses, or other services that bureaucrats provide, and 0 otherwise; the latter is the log of the total bribe amount (in dollars) that the firm has paid in all interactions with the bureaucracy. 9 Data on pay_bribe is available for both survey years, but log_total_bribe is only available for 2005.
Lobby group membership is determined by asking firms whether they are a member of a business association. Association membership status is available for both survey years. While data on bribe payments deals only with bureaucratic corruption, some survey questions provide sufficient information to gauge the firms' involvement in higher-level corruption such as unofficial payments to legislators to affect votes, payments to judges to affect court decisions, and illegal contributions to political parties. It is this set of variables that the analysis will utilize when examining whether business association membership facilitates higher-level corruption by opening the door to a previously in- The responses are ordinal on a scale of 0-4 from no impact to decisive impact. Though the survey makes a point of not directly ask firms their corruption activities with regard to high-level officials, this is clearly the intention of the question. On average over 80% of respondents claimed that these practices had no direct impact on their business, suggesting that most firms do not engage in political corruption. Finally, the majority of studies utilizing the BEEPS data have used business association membership and lobbying interchangeably. However associations can serve multiple functions and provide many benefits to members. The BEEPS survey asks firms to rate the six association services described in Table 2 on a scale of 0 to 4 from being of no value to the firm to being of critical value. 10 Looking at the mean values of each category I find 10 The categories are no value, minor value, moderate value, major value, and critical value that firms actually identify lobbying as one of the least important association functions.
Firms cite product market information, information on government regulations, and help with certification and accreditation as the most valuable services provided to them. Table 3 presents pairwise correlation coefficients for the main outcome and explanatory variables. For both survey years the correlation between paying bribes to bureaucrats and being a member of a business association is extremely low. In fact, the 95% confidence interval for this correlation includes 0 for both years, indicating that we cannot reject that the true correlation between these variables is zero. A few other correlations of note include the relatively large positive correlations between association membership, age of the firm, number of employees, and export status. Paying bribes to bureaucrats is negatively correlated with government ownership and positively correlated with involvement in political corruption. In the following section I further explore the relationship between government regulations, assocation membership and corruption.
Empirical Framework and Results
Regulations, Corruption, and Lobby Group Membership
I first test the theoretical model's prediction that bribe payments are more prevalent among firms that are most affected by government regulations. I use the full survey dataset to estimate the effect of different types of regulations on both the prevalence and magnitude of bribe payments:
The first model is a probit regression that examines the determinants of paying bribes, while the second is a linear regression that looks at the magnitude of bribe payments in
2005.
11 Regulations i,t is the set of ordinal regulatory variables described in Tables 4 and 5 .
Models 1 through 4 of Table 4 indicate that firms more affected by each of the four regulatory obstacles are more likely to pay bribes to bureaucrats. When including them all as covariates in model 5, I still find that all but the reported effect of labor regulations are significantly associated with an increased likelihood of paying bribes. In addition, firms that spend more time dealing with government regulations are also more likely to pay bribes. Larger companies, as measured by employment, are less likely to bribe than smaller ones. However the magnitude of the effect is economically insignificant, as a doubling of the number of employees leads to a less than one percent reduction in the probability to pay bribes in all model specifications. Note also that government owned firms are less likely to pay bribes. regulations not only increase the likelihood of paying bribes but also the size of the payment. In addition we now have the expected positive sign on employment. The effect of employment on the bribe amount is fairly substantial: a 10% increase in employment is associated with a 7.5% increase in the size of the bribe. Finally, though government ownership reduces the likelihood of paying a bribe it does not affect the size of the payment if one is made. This suggests that government owned firms may be able to secure certain services without going through the regular bureaucratic channels; however when a bribe needs to be paid, even government ownership does not alter the bargaining power relationship between bureaucrat and firm.
I now turn to the determinants of lobby group membership. Recall from the theoretical model that the decision to lobby is largely a function of the size of the firm. In addition the model predicts that firms facing the most regulations will gain the most benefit from lobbying. Finally lobbying becomes less useful if the firm can pay a cheap enough bribe, which again depends on its bargaining power. To test these predictions I estimate the following probit model:
Since the theory suggests that bribing and lobbying will share many of the same determinants, I employ most of the explanatory variables from the previous analysis.
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The results are presented in Table 6 . Larger firms are more likely to be association members, as are those that spend more time dealing with government regulations. Exporters, foreign-owned firms, and firms that have recently introduced new products are also more likely to be members. From Table 4 we see that these firms are also more likely to pay bribes. It may be that they face additional regulations which increase their need to bribe, or simply lack the bargaining power to avoid paying. Consequently they have more reason than other firms to be lobby group members and attempt to improve the regulatory environment. Finally government owned firms are less likely to be members. Earlier we saw that these firms are also less likely to pay bribes. It is reasonable to conjecture that these firms simply don't face the same costly regulations as their counterparts in the private sector. Without a significant regulatory burden, they need neither bribe nor lobby.
Panel Analysis of Lobbying and Bribes
The previous analysis has tested the predictions of the theoretical model with regard to the determinants of bribing and lobbying, albeit in a static setting. However the model as the dependent variable. Since the majority of variation in the data is cross-sectional rather than across time, the "within" estimator of a fixed effects model is likely to be inconsistent and parameter estimates from these models will have inflated standard errors; conversely this approach does not suffer from those drawbacks. I present the regression results in Table 7 .
Here we see that the decision to join a lobby group is unaffected by whether or not a firm pays bribes in 2002. We also see that larger firms are more likely to join between survey years. Foreign firms are also more likely to join, again indicating that foreign companies may face additional regulatory constraints vis-a-vis domestic companies and can benefit more from lobbying. The other bargaining power variables have lost significance as compared to the full-sample regression. This is very likely due to the panel data having a considerably smaller sample size, though it is also possible that the determinants of lobby group entry are not entirely the same as the characterstics of an "average" member firm.
In sum the results of this regression suggest that even though lobbying and corruption may be two means to the same end, the decision to lobby is not directly dependent on whether or not a firm pays bribes. Of particular relevance to the analysis of this dataset is that lobbying by business associations may be a quasi-public good, where efforts to improve the regulatory environment can potentially impact all firms in an industry and not just association members. Non-members might therefore benefit without having to join a lobby group themselves, regardless of how frequently they pay bribes.
Does Lobby Group Membership Impact Future Bribes?
Though the decision to bribe does not affect the decision to join a lobby group, it is still possible that lobbying can reduce the need to bribe. Again, the theoretical model predicts that equilibrium bribes in period 2 are falling in lobbying efforts in period 1 because a reduction in the regulatory burden will subsequently reduce the maximum bribe a firm is willing to pay. I test this model prediction by determining whether joining a lobby group after 2002 affects bribe payments in 2005. I look at both the probability of paying a bribe as well as the total bribe amount paid: Table 8 .
Neither the frequency nor magnitude of bribe payments in 2005 is significantly different between firms that join lobby groups and those that remain non-members. Here the predictions of the theoretical model do not hold up, yet this is not entirely surprising.
The theory predicts that lobbying will reduce future bribe payments to the extent that it is successful in improving regulatory conditions. Some degree of success is guaranteed in the model (albeit with reducing marginal returns to lobbying), but this may not be the case in reality. Lobby groups may be unsuccessful in bringing about regulatory reform thus necessitating larger bribe payments. In addition three years may be an insufficient amount of time to improve conditions. Finally we must consider that some business associations simply lobby less than others and instead direct their efforts to the provision of other services. This last point is the focus of the following section.
Services Provided by Business Associations
As in previous studies, this paper has thus far used lobbying interchangeably with association membership. However there are many other services that business associations offer. As mentioned earlier the firms in the BEEPS data actually value lobbying to a lesser degree than product market and regulatory information or accreditation and licensing services. But do all firms seek the same benefits, or are certain firm characteristics associated with one particular association function or another? This issue is explored empirically using the six questions regarding the value of different association services described in the data section. Using the full-sample survey data I estimate an ordered probit model of the following form:
V alue i,t is the vector of different association services that firms can rate. The probability of observing an ordinal response category j for a particular service is a function of the underlying latent continuous variable V alue * i,t , itself a function of the regressors, being within empirically determined threshold values µ j and µ j−1 . x i,t is again the vector of explanatory variables used in the previous analyses, but with one important addition:
impact_bribe_legislators, the measure of a firm's involvement in political corruption, is now included as a covariate. v i is again the vector of fixed effects and w t is the year effect. The results are presented in Table 9 .
As expected all firms do not value every association service equally. Firms burdened by customs and trade regulations value multiple services, however they value international product market information to a significantly greater degree than the rest. Similarly dealing with labor regulations is associated with valuing informational services on government regulations, while licensing and permit problems are associated with valuing dispute resolution mechanisms. Firms recently introducing new products appear to value every single association service, as do larger firms. However in the case of company size the parameter estimate is biggest with regard to lobbying services, supporting previous results that large firms do in fact lobby more frequently. Foreign firms value lobbying services while exporters are concerned with international product market information and accreditation standards.
Of particular interest is that impact_bribe_legislators is positively and significantly associated with every association service. That is, firms engaging in political corruption appear to be interested in all of the services a business association offers. However the magnitude of the parameter estimate in the lobbying and dispute resolution models is much larger than for any other association service, suggesting that political corruption is most closely linked to these two functions. This result implies a close relationship between lobbying and political corruption within the framework of business association membership, and will be further examined in the next section.
Do Business Associations Facilitate Political Corruption?
The distinction between lobbying and political corruption has always been tenuous. In The question is then whether lobbying activities by business associations increase the likelihood of bribe payments to legislators in order to receive favorable treatment.
Political Corruption After Joining an Association
This section will measure the effect of association membership on a firm's involvement and other firm characteristics indicates that the increase in political corruption activities is in fact the result of joining an association. But is it in fact the lobbying efforts of these associations that makes bribing legislators so appealing, or do associations exert a corrupting influence on all members regardless of whether they value lobbying or not?
Political Corruption and Association Services
When looking at the services provided by business associations the results suggested that political corruption was most strongly associated with lobbying and dispute resolution. To more formally investigate this point I again use the full sample survey data to estimate an ordered probit model similar to the one presented in section 5.3, but now use Impact_Bribe_Legislators as the dependent variable and the association services as regressors. The model is as follows:
V alue i,t is again the vector of association services. These services enter the model both individually and collectively creating multiple model specifications. The results are presented in Table 11 , and indicate that while multiple association services are positively correlated with an increased impact of bribing legislators, when including them as covariates (specification (7) in the table) only lobbying and dispute resolution remain significant.
The association services variables are highly correlated, which suggests that multicollinearity may be causing a reduction in their statistical significance when they enter the model as covariates. However even individually we see that lobbying and dispute resolution have the strongest correlation with bribing legislators based on the size of the parameter estimates alone. As interpreting the magnitude of an effect is difficult by simply looking at an ordered probit regression table, I also present the predicted probabilities of different levels of Impact_Bribe_Legislators at different valuations of lobbying and dispute resolution.
What is most apparent is that, of the services provided by business associations, lobbying and dispute resolution are clearly the two areas where political corruption can play the most significant role. Firms can either bribe legislators to affect favorable regulatory change or other lawmakers to gain an upper hand in disputes with regulators and competing companies.
Conclusion
Corruption and lobbying are frequently two means to the same end, and previous studies have documented the relative success of each approach. This paper examines when and why firms choose either strategy, and how the two are related in contending with government regulations. I propose a model where regulations can be overcome by either bribing a bureaucrat responsible for their implementation or lobbying the government to bring about regulatory reform. I show that paying bribes is always part of an optimal strategy, and that the bribe amount is increasing in the cost of the regulation and decreasing in the bargaining power of the firm. Whether a firm chooses to lobby in addition to paying bribes depends on several factors. In particular, larger firms are more likely to lobby than smaller ones because they benefit the most from regulatory reform, while firms with the most bargaining power are able to pay a low enough bribe to eliminate the need for lobbying altogether.
Using the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS dataset of Eastern European enterprises I test the
predictions of the theoretical model by analyzing the firm-level determinants of lobbying and corruption. I find that both the magnitude and frequency of bribe payments to bureaucrats is increasing in the regulatory burden a firm faces. In addition firms with less bargaining power, such as exporters or foreign owned companies, are more likely to pay bribes. These same firms are also more likely to be members of business associations, which is consistent with the model prediction that lobbying becomes increasingly more useful when firms have less bargaining power and face large regulatory costs. Finally I find that large firms are in fact more likely than smaller ones to be members of business associations.
Though lobbying and bribe payments depend on many of the same variables, I do not find a direct causal link between the two activities. Examining a subset of firms that were interviewed in both survey years I find that bribe paying firms are no more likely to join a business association between 2002 and 2005 than firms that do not pay bribes; likewise firms do not stop paying bribes to bureaucrats after joining an association. As suggested by the theory, the decision to engage in either activity appear to be more a result of regulatory constraints than anything else. It may be that successful lobbying can improve regulations to the point where bribe payments fall in the future. That this is not borne out in the data may suggest that lobbying efforts were unsuccessful between 2002 and 2005, or that these countries required more time to enact the appropriate reforms.
Finally I find that firms joining business associations are more likely to bribe rulemakers than those that remained non-members. Involvement in political corruption is particularly related to how interested a firm is in association lobbying and dispute resolution services. Since lobby groups grant access to politicians, it is not unreasonable to think that some firms may take advantage of this opportunity and channel their bribes to higher-level officials to either speed up the pace of regulatory reform or gain other advantages. Likewise when firms are in a dispute with competitors or regulators, bribing the right person may go a long way towards improving their situation.
Bribing and lobbying are two important weapons in a firm's arsenal, and their use is dependent on regulatory conditions and firm characteristics. We can only hope that as conditions improve and countries grow, the firms in Eastern Europe will move away from corruption and take greater advantage of the lobbying and other services offered by business associations. 
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